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When discussing the history of the united States Communist 
Party, it is imperative that one understands not only its 
intimate relationship to the Soviet Union, but also its particular 
status within that relationship. The destructive political 
vicissitudes of the American Party were never in response to 
internal changes in American society itself, but always reflected 
the strict requirements imposed on them by Moscow. Even in 
times when the party's tracks were clear and seemingly autonomous, 
one must search for their Soviet sources. To ignore this crucial 
fact or to pretend otherwise is to misunderstand and distort 
the entire history of American Communism and to miss an essential 
clue regarding its nature. 
The consequences of this odd political relationship would 
evade serious conflict only as long as the American Party 
remained on the periphery of national life. For a short period 
in the 1930's, however, the communists were a serious factor 
in American politics, and many envisioned a permanent role for 
them in American domestic affairs. This prospect was soon laid 
to rest in 1939 with the signing of the Hitler-Stalin Pact, and 
the party once more bowed to the wishes of Moscow by reverting 
back to the isolated life of a revolutionary sect, in all its 
impotency and ineffectuality. There arises a fundamental 
question out of this disastrous shift in policy that historians 
have time and time again failed to properly address: Why did 
party members, often intelligent, ambitious, and well-educated 
people, choose to obey this humiliating mandate from the Soviet 
government after experiencing real pOlitical success for the 
1 
first time in their party's history? The purpose of the following 
essay is to provide an effective answer to this seemingly 
inexplicable question, while lending insight into why these 
people decided to become communists in a capitalist land. 
At the Comintern international convention in 1929, Josef 
Stalin presented a resounding speech to the assembly, stating 
emphatically that the pOlicy of the Communist parties around 
the world could not under any circumstances be based on the 
peculiarities of anyone nation, but must be uniform throughout 
1 
the world. Stalin implied further, and the delegates present 
at the convention clearly understood, that this blanket policy 
would be set and distributed by the Kremlin, which translated 
into the personal whims of Stalin himself. The Soviet union, 
at this time, was still totally committed to the rigid orthodox 
view of Leninist Marxism and its advocacy of a world proletarian 
revolution. This ideology, therefore, became the basis for 
American party policy as well. American Communists continuously 
railed against liberals, progressives, and non-communist radicals, 
labeling them "social fascists" for positioning themselves 
2 
between the masses and social revolution. Accordingly, their 
impact on American politics was near nil. 
By 1934, however, the world order was in the midst of 
dramatic change, and because of these sweeping changes newfound 
opportunities for achieving legitimacy arose for the American 
Communists. The rise of fascism, particularly that of Hitler, 
was proceeding at an alarming rate, and most were convinced that 
he threatened the world. Thus, the Soviet view of fascism, 
2 
that it was merely a symptom of capitalist decay and was positioning 
itself in desperation as a bulwark against social revolution, 
was articulated into action at the Seventh Comintern Congress 
in 1935. It was there that General Secretary Georgi Dimitrov 
unveiled a new policy to be adopted by all parties throughout 
the world. Communists everywhere were called upon to abandon 
"temporarily" their goal of revolutionary conquest of power 
and join with socialists, trade unionists, and liberals in a 
3 
broad "people's front." Liberals and progressives who had 
formerly been attacked as social fascists were now desired as 
allies in creating popular domestic front coalitions to promote 
4 
democracy and the broadest possible unity against fascism. 
The overwhelming success with which the American Communist 
Party utilized this latest dictate from the Comintern was 
totally unexpected. It allowed for a much more realistic 
political strategy tailored to United States interests, thereby 
allowing the party to emerge with an entirely new and much more 
appealing image. In a matter of months after Dimitrov's speech 
at the Comintern Congress, the American Communist Party had, 
for all intents and purposes, entered the mainstream of American 
5 
politics. They successfully infiltrated various trade unions 
across the country and played key administrative roles in a 
6 
number of New Deal relief projects. By 1936, the party became 
the self-appointed vanguard of the entire Democratic Front 
organized to support Franklin D. Roosevelt and to crush Adolf 
Hitler. Party membership rose dramatically to around 100,000 
members, approaching the level of strength attained by Eugene 
3  
Deb's Socialist Party in the decade before the First World 
War, which had since then served as the high water mark of 
7 
American radicalism. 
One feature that was particularly illustrative of the 
Communists' growth in influence and popularity was respectful 
attention they began to receive in the press. Daily newspapers 
throughout the northeast regularly printed articles, editorials, 
and pOll listings on communist activity, and American party 
leader Earl Browder became the first Communist ever to speak 
before such established bodies as the National Press Club and 
8 
the New York Herald-Tribune's Annual Forum. Due primarily to 
this marked increase in favorable recognition, scores of 
intellectuals, young people, unemployed workers, and even a 
few elected officials fell under nominal party sway. To the 
utter horror of conservatives across the country, it looked as 
though the Communist Party would enjoy a permanent role in 
American domestic affairs. 
Permanency in the American political scene was one thing 
that would never be attained, however, regardless of how positive 
their prospects looked in late 1938. Just when American Party 
members were finally convinced that political marginality was 
a thing of the past, a devastating bombshell was cruelly dropped 
upon them, cancelling out every single gain that they had labored 
so tirelessly for in one decisive action. On August 23, 1939, 
Stalin entered into a non-aggression pact with Hitler, and 
subsequently summoned all communists of the world to halt their 
popular front activities and adopt once again the ineffectual 
4  
9 
goal of world conquest by social revolution. It was necessary 
for Stalin to call an end to these popular front coalitions 
since their primary purpose had been to stop Hitler's advance. 
In light of recent developments in Europe, it was suddenly 
much more convenient, as well as lucrative for Stalin to welcome 
Hitler as a military ally, and he was anxious to prove himself 
trustworthy. The American party leadership was both stunned 
and disheartened by this latest order, for they knew that such 
an abrupt about-face would entail severe political costs. within 
two months after the Pact went into effect, however, the American 
Communist Party did in fact revert back to their older, more 
10 
militant policies. By October, the various New Deal projects 
that party members so assiduously dedicated themselves to were 
operating without them, and the favorable press coverage that 
11 
the Party had enjoyed, likewise disappeared. This unexpected 
turn toward extremism severed carefully cUltivated relationships 
with liberals and trade unions, and the Party's store of trust 
and goodwill became totally depleted. No one could escape the 
conclusion that American Communist domestic policy was hostage 
to Soviet foreign policy. 
Why, one should simply ask, did it have to be this way? 
After sixteen long years of obscurity, American Communists 
were finally enjoying their first experience of real power, 
and for the first time their activity was being rewarded with 
tangible results of sUbstantial measure. For the Party to 
simply concede to the whims of Stalin at this point in time 
was not only politically irrational, but spiritually destructive. 
5 
The primary problem with this orthodox world structure 
for the American Communists, was that the Soviet Union chose 
to ignore too many uniquely American characteristics, such as 
America's diverse labor force, its intense liberal traditions, 
and its dynamic classes. Instead, the Soviets insisted on 
compressing America's left into rigid social and economic 
categories that denied recognition or authenticity to everything 
but class, in effect trivializing the nation's most heartfelt 
beliefs and commitments. American Communists, the self-proclaimed 
"voice of the masses," suddenly found themselves once again 
to be strangers in a strange land. This ridiculously strict 
adherence to the Soviet line of thought made it impossible to 
mobilize discontent, which was real and widespread, and returned 
them to their traditional problem of being a movement without 
followers. The brief era of the Popular Front proved unequivocally, 
that if Marxism were to succeed in America, it somehow had to 
maintain ties with indigenous American values. 
The real tragedy in all of this lies in the fact that 
there were several people during this time, some within the 
party and some outside it, who did recognize the counter-productivity 
of blind allegiance to the materialist world view of Moscow 
and chose to articulate their views publicly. Jay Lovestone, 
one of the original founders of the American Party and its 
leader throughout most of the twenties, had argued vehemently 
against this world view. Lovestone maintained that America 
was unlike all other nations of the world and stated continuously 
that although the Comintern might have the right idea concerning 
6  
the world at large, this idea was whOlly inadequate for 
12 
communist activity in the United States. with this platform, 
he won the backing of over ninety percent of the party's 
convention in 1929, but the Comintern swiftly ousted him, 
making it clear that Marxists heretics of any shape or form 
13 
would not be tolerated. Even as late as the early thirties, 
the time immediately prior to the Popular Front period, there 
were people like George Charney, who, because he wanted to 
remain in favor with both the American Party and the Comintern, 
suppressed many of his most pressing concerns. At the same time, 
however, he realized the impracticality of ignoring American 
interests and therefore toned down much of the Soviet political 
14 
rhetoric while discussing grievances with the nation's shopworkers. 
In addition to these two men, there were scores of others who 
realized that the Communist Party as a political institution 
could stand a reassessment of its policies. Whether public or 
private, the party was not without its resident critics. 
Much more resonant than critics within the party, were 
those who believed in the basic value of Marxism but were not 
party members. The great debate of "American Exceptionalism" 
was popular among intellectuals during the twenties and thirties, 
and out of it grew a number of viable alternatives to the 
orthodox view that American Communists would have done well 
to utilize. One such alternative was the philosophy of Sidney 
Hook. A former student of the pragmatist John Dewey and an 
engaged Marxian radical, Hook came to America from Germany 
15 
in 1926, continuing his writings on Marxist ideology. Hook's 
7  
Toward the Understanding of Karl Marx was the most important 
work of philosophy that had as yet been produced on the American 
Left. Hook anchored his critique in the pragmatist claim that 
science (which Marxism supposedly is) is objectively true, 
16 
regardless of personal values or society's class character. 
Authentic Marxism, which blends object and sUbject, was therefore 
not a science. More specifically, real science, for Hook, 
invalidated orthodoxy by proving that favorable economic conditions 
17 
alone will not necessarily cause a revolution. Other, more 
sUbjective factors are needed, such as class consciousness and 
18 
a people's critical openness to anti-capitalist propaganda. 
Hook basically believed that Marxism was a realistic method of 
social action, and he accepted most of Marx's theories because 
they expressed workers' practical interests. In this view, 
Marxist Communism directs people to act reflexively in order to 
satisfy real needs, rather than wait for history's laws to 
19 
unfold mechanically. 
This is a very practical concept, one that American Communists 
would have done well to employ. In fact, it was the American 
Party's strict refusal to oppose Stalinism that so frustrated 
Hook into giving up his writings on Marxist ideology. Following 
the orthodox establishment's hostile rejection of his Toward 
the Understanding of Karl Marx, he withdrew into the study of 
20 
Dewey's Pragmatism for the remainder of his life. 
Another Marxist intellectual, Paul Mattick, presented a 
perspective that scorned the very force behind the Russian 
Revolution of 1917. This view, undoubtedly, could have supplied 
8  
the American Communists with a credible means by which they 
could cast aside the entire soviet orthodox view. Mattick 
charged that the Russian Revolution and the subsequent Soviet 
rise to power was not Socialist at all. Rather than empowering 
workers, as Marx had intended, they simply abolished the Bourgeosie 
21 
without touching capital as a social relationship. Workers 
and peasants in this socialist state were, according to Mattick, 
still exploited. Only the exploiters changed. Workers were 
still deprived of their self-initiative and were still sUbjected 
to the control of a leadership which did not share their living 
22 
and working conditions. 
Mattick's alternative brand of Marxism was rooted in the 
early twentieth century Council Communist movement founded by 
23 
the Dutchmen Antoine Pannekoek and Herman Gorter. Mattick 
believed, as these men had, that socialism would originate as 
spontaneous popular insurrections of angry workers struggled 
to improve factory conditions, and these insurrections would 
eventually be institutionalized into self-governing workers' 
24 
councils that directed production and regulated pUblic policy. 
In this belief, Mattick seemed to be searching for the purist, 
most authentic brand of socialism, an ideology uncorrupted by 
the post-revolutionary Lenin and the paranoia-induced mandates 
of Stalin, a socialism where workers not only retained their 
role as those who held society together, but literally governed 
it as well. 
The views of Hook and Mattick not only provide other 
ideological paths which American Communists could have followed, 
9  
and followed with probable success, but both serve to highlight 
Marxism's ideal functions which had long since been cast aside 
in favor of an oppressive, monolithic world movement. With 
these other realistic options, it seems all the more unbelievable 
that the American Party chose complete pOlitical disaster in 
the United States. To be certain, there were a number of 
party members who, while remaining committed to the basic 
principles of Leninist Marxism, did favor a slight shift in 
policy to accommodate specific American interests. Two men in 
particular, Mike Gold and Joseph Freeman, held this view, but 
made the fatal mistake of sharing it with the rest of the party 
25 
in a 1934 article about communist political strategies. They 
soon came under severe reprimand for this breech of conduct, and 
26 
eventually lost their jobs as co-editors of the New Masses. 
Their lack of impact was due partly to the party's 
organizational structure, more specifically, the commanding 
authority of the high party officials. The American Party 
officials were, and had always been, quite intimate with the 
Soviet leadership and always had the final say on which ideas 
were considered acceptable and which ones were not. Among 
the vast majority of the party membership, however, there existed 
a strong tension between "professional proletarians" who labored 
day in and day out to further the communist cause, and the 
so called "college boys" who philosophized on how the world 
27 
could be improved but did little to improve it themselves. 
Of course, there were many educated people within the Communist 
Party, but these people had long ago chosen to discard the 
10  
more elitist or bourgeois elements of their former life in 
favor of Marxist principles. They also worked along side their 
comrades out on the streets. This deep suspicion of intellectuals 
helps greatly to explain why few intellectuals joined the party, 
as well as why the work of intellectuals like and Mattick 
28 
received such little recognition. 
Nevertheless, the party membership was not any less 
intelligent than other segments of society, and when one takes 
into consideration many of America's obviously unique qualities, 
these outside views seem to be so much better suited for political 
success. In an attempt to explain this rather illogical approach 
to American political activity, a few individuals have presented 
the supposition that the Communist Party of the United States 
was hostage to Soviet ideology solely because it was a financial 
hostage as well. Many people support the explanation that the 
Soviet government funded the American Communist cause, and 
there is substantial evidence to indicate that this is in fact 
true. Eugene Lyons, a journalist for the Associated Press who 
worked in Moscow through the late twenties and early thirties, 
is convinced, based on interviews with both Soviet and American 
Communists, that although the prestige the Soviet Union had 
as the world's only Marxist nation gave it wide influence 
with the communists in America, it was "their control of the 
28 
purse strings that clinched it." 
It is true of course that no political organization can 
long run without money. The American Communist Party was 
blessed with thousands of devoted members who volunteered their 
11  
services without expecting immediate compensation. Its 
hordes of functionaries willingly worked long hours for minimal 
pay. Even so, supporting hundreds of party workers, financing 
a daily newspaper and several foreign language papers, and 
running a variety of campaigns did not come cheap by any stretch 
of the imagination. Compounding the normal vicissitudes of 
raising money, furthermore, was the fact that the party's 
29 
constituency was hardly wealthy. 
Party finances have always been one of the murkier corners 
of American Communist history. The national organization's 
30 
income in 1931 was $88,434, and in 1932 it rose to $97,806. 
The advent of the Popular Front filled the party treasury with 
31 
an average annual income of $325,000 from 1936 through 1938. 
These figures, however, understate enormously the party's total 
income. The Daily Worker was financed separately, and sales 
and advertisements were far from sufficient to keep it afloat. 
A special fund drive among Communists and their sympathizers 
usually reduced the substantial yearly deficit, but the amount 
received from this activity was never totally adequate. Yet 
32 
the debt was always settled by the end of the fiscal year. 
The source of the remaining revenue is suspiciously absent 
33 
from all known financial accounts. 
In 1938, an obscure Texas congressman by the name of 
Martin Dies called for a select House committee to probe 
34 
un-American propaganda activities in the United States. The 
committee eventually carne to focus on communist financing of 
the labor movement. Although it was discovered that labor 
12  
movement funds received by communist organizations were not 
sUbstantial, they nevertheless uncovered some very interesting 
35 
figures regarding Communist Party finances. Dies Committee 
accountants who examined sUbpoenaed bank records testified 
that between March 1937 and March 1939, William Browder, the 
party's treasurer, had deposited $1,302,173 in two checking 
36 
accounts and a savings account. The committee also audited 
forty-three bank accounts held by the party, its subsidiaries, 
publishing houses, and auxiliaries. Most went back two to three 
years, but the account of the Daily Worker was examined back 
to 1932. The accountants were not questioned too scrupulously 
on details, but the total deposits in those forty-three accounts 
37 
added up to $10,164,730. Clearly, the Communist Party was 
spending large sums of money throughout the 1930's whose source 
was simply unaccounted for. 
It is quite a difficult task to discern the origin of 
all these unexplained funds. Dues provided a portion of party 
income, but being quite modest, cannot account for the vast 
majority of it. Many communists at this time, moreover, were 
still either unemployed, were housewives, or made less than 
38 
$10 a week so they would pay only a few cents a month. Years 
later, several former party members testified that the Comintern 
supplied large blocs of cash to the financially-strapped American 
39 
Party throughout the 1920's and most of the thirties. In 
addition, Earl Browder admitted several years after his expulsion 
from the party that between 1930 and 1935 the Comintern provided 
about ten percent of the party's funds, a subsidy he managed 
13  
40  
to enlarge after becoming Party General Secretary. There is 
also a woman by the name of Hede Massing, a self-confessed 
Soviet spy in America, who has stated that between 1930 and 
1944 the Soviet government openly subsidized the party through 
the Runag News Agency. Secret funds, she alleges, were continually 
41 
funneled into party coffers. In her testimony to the Dies 
Committee, Massing recounted meeting. a disappointed Browder 
who had thought that she was delivering money to him after a 
42 
European trip. She also told of paying large sums of Comintern 
money (reportedly in the tens of thousands) to a J. Peters in 
return for false passports to be used by her spy network in 
43 
trips back and forth from the United States to the Soviet Union. 
Interestingly, many people affiliated with the Russian 
Communist Party have corraborated these various allegations. 
Dr. D.H. Dubrowsky, a charter member of the Communist Party 
of Russia, has spoken about even more staggering transfers of 
money. DUbrowsky held a series of appointments representing 
agencies of the Soviet government, principally the Russian Red 
Cross, in the United States. Appalled by Stalin's ruthlessness, 
44 
he severed his ties to the Russians in 1935. He has stated 
repeatedly that the Soviets raised millions of dollars a year 
in America through film concessions, estate and insurance claims, 
and other "swindles"- more than enough money, he maintains, to 
45 
finance American Communist activities. He furthermore stresses 
that the American Party directly benefited from this largesse 
46 
throughout the twenties and most of the thirties. 
As it is plain to see, there is ample documented evidence 
14 
and first hand testimony that makes allegations of a Soviet 
buyout seem quite convincing. This explanation, however, in 
all its apparent certainty, is simply inadequate. Soviet 
financial support of the American Communist Party would only 
serve to explain the subservience of the high party officials 
who actually received this money and who wanted to ensure its 
continued flow. It does not, however, shed even a twinkling 
of light on why most rank and file party members, who remained 
far detached from the upper echelons of the party hierarchy 
and therefore never saw any of this money, would continuously 
endure verbal abuse and beatings on the picket lines and 
sometimes even jail for a cause such as this. These people 
were the true idealists, and in trying to discover why such 
people would put up with these demoralizing Soviet mandates, 
any answer with Soviet financial control as its main premise 
carries no validity whatsoever. People this whole-heartedly 
committed to anything cannot be influenced by money. 
The real explanation for these people is broader and 
much more complex. Ironically, it first became noticeable 
immediately after the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, the 
very thing that ruined them politically in America. Living 
through the Great Depression, the true believers in Marxism, 
and indeed all American Communists, had been exposed to all 
the negative features of America's social order- the stark 
contrast between wealth and poverty, the terrible waste of 
resources, the bewildering paradox of want in the face of plenty, 
and the glaring ineffectiveness of government. Against this 
15  
backdrop, they believed, and more ardently as the years passed, 
that a dynamic new society was emerging in the Soviet Union, a 
society that had shaken itself free from the defeats of capitalism-
unemployment and class-bound poverty- and needed only time to 
lift a semi-feudal society to heights of unprecedented affluence 
47 
for all people. Marxism seemed an appropriate panacea for 
all American woes as well. Thus, many began to profess their 
faith in this ideology, embracing it with tired but open arms. 
In this context, Communism is less of a political party 
and more of a secular religion to its members. The success 
of political parties in the United States is traditionally 
measured solely by the number of representatives they have in 
congress and their corresponding influence on legislation. 
These standards have been applied to the Communist Party as 
well. Communism, however is a strange phenomenon of the modern 
day, where nothing exists that is remotely comparable, and 
political activity is secondary to the unyielding faith that 
it demands from its members. This faith that Marxism was the 
future course for humanity and therefore the correct path to 
take is the primary factor in explaining people's adherence to 
the wishes of the Soviet state. One must recognize that to the 
true idealists, the USSR was a shining example of the application 
of Marxist ideology, for it was at the time the only nation 
48 
to have brought about a successful communist revolution. 
Naturally, therefore, the American Communists, as did all other 
Communists around the world, looked to the Soviet Union for 
guidance. 
16 
This Soviet guidance, however, went far beyond that of 
a political nature. A 1934 poem by American Communist Malvina 
Reynolds described the Soviet Union as "a heaven brought to 
49 
Earth in Russia." The description was not hyperbole, but 
reflected the mental star around which the world of American 
Communism turned. Communists around the world saw in Russia 
a Marxist utopia that was attainable in their country as well, 
and along with intellectual guidance and financial aid, the 
Soviet Union provided American Communists with a religious-
like support. This intimate link gave American Communists 
the spiritual strength to believe that they would overcome the 
capitalist leviathan, and would eventually create heaven itself. 
Moscow became the Vatican of Communism, issuing writs and 
decrees demanding world unity and affirming the need for 
uniformity in goals. Nationalist sentiment of any kind amounted 
to blasphemy and had no place in Stalin's materialist bible. 
The concept of world unity is in fact the cornerstone 
of orthodox Marxist faith. In his memoirs, Irving Howe discusses 
this particular concept, calling it "Communism's most vital 
50 
component." This brand of faith, as in any other religion, 
holds a person's values and beliefs together and integrates 
their purposes. At the same time, it reflects a sense of 
worthiness of the values that keeps their world from falling 
apart in the midst of crisis. Thus, people who were intellectually 
convinced of the virtues and overall righteousness of Communism 
came to rely more and more on their faith in these beliefs 
when confronted with obstacles like the Nazi-Soviet Pact. 
17 
George Charney, a party member for twenty-five years, tells 
what Communism meant to him: 
At the time I decided to join the party, I, like 
many, was groping for a new spiritual center, for  
a new God to replace the Jehovah that failed, for  
a new absolute, for a new faith. It proved to be  
as enthralling as any in the past; more so, since  
faith and science, deemed incompatible by the  
traditional church, were now inextricably fused  
together in the Marxist world-view. Thus, it was  
not long after I joined the party that I came to  
accept each doctrine as an article of faith, never  
to be questioned. 51  
Charney's words not only reveal the power and overwhelming 
spirituality felt by people who were connected to the communist 
movement, but they also illustrate how Communism could also 
serve as a substitute for traditional religion. Benjamin 
Davis, a former party member who served as a New York City 
Councilman during the thirties, reaffirms this spiritual 
aspect and emphasizes the perceived power to alter the course 
52 
of history that many felt they possessed. Both he and Irving 
Howe speak of a "collective will l' of Communists around the 
world, that in time, would transform humanity into a civilization 
53 
of eternal peace and harmony. For Communists, this overwhelming 
sense of possibility and the feeling that history was on their 
side was much stronger than the disappointment wrought by mere 
national or regional setbacks. The general attitude toward the 
signing of the agreement between Stalin and Hitler was best summed 
up by communist labor organizer Bill Bailey in his statement: 
One day we may live in a world where there is no 
such thing as a bomb or a gun, and it may be a 
criminal offense to let someone go hungry. That's 
the type of world we want. We got to keep going. 
To give up now would be the worst type of cowardice 
I can think of. 54 
18 
55  
Charney put it more succinctly: "Our faith held." 
To be certain, given the sequence of events that followed 
the Hitler-Stalin Pact, the extent to which American Communists 
had to rely on faith rather than critical thinking in order 
56 
to remain loyal reached new heights. People did leave the 
party, but by and large, these individuals had never been 
among the party's most ardent supporters, and it must be said 
that the party membership rolls had always exhibited a moderate 
57 
turnover rate. This segment was largely composed of drifters, 
people who had not paid dues in over a year (the usual 
deadline set by the party leadership), or people who had 
found employment since joining the party and therefore no 
58 
longer needed the material support that the party provided. 
None of these people can be called "faithful Marxists." 
Many who left the party, moreover, were victims of 
expulsion. Following every policy change, the Soviet government 
gave the American Party little choice in cleansing itself of 
those who had been a little too zealous about the previous 
party line, especially if this enthusiastic approach transformed 
them into high-profile figures within the party. Always 
quite thorough in his purges, Stalin would be indirectly 
involved in removing as much as ten percent of the party 
from the membership rolls following a radical shift in policy. 
Former presidential candidate William Z. Foster was met with 
60 
this fate, as was Earl Browder in 1946. 
The vast majority of the rank and file remained far 
removed from all of this. They had embraced the ideology 
19 
59 
but would never rise to the top of the party ranks. For the 
most part, they were simply ordinary people, but they were 
people with a stronger sense of purpose and a feeling that time 
was on their side. Communism's true believers, like those of 
any other religion, understood that one does not branch off 
into a heretical sect when faced with an unattractive or 
seemingly contradictory order from above. They took refuge 
in their faith and adapted in order to conform to what was 
expected of them. Malvina Reynolds maintains, as do many 
other former communists, that no one who did not experience 
61 
the movement can understand what it meant. To these people, 
communism of any kind was better than capitalism, and was 
worth any sacrifice. 
There have been many harsh critics of Marxism over the 
years, who, with the convenience of hindsight, ridicule its 
principles by stating that thoughtful citizens decide for 
themselves what to believe and that an impersonal social 
theory such as this is totally useless. The real point not 
to be forgotten, however, is that the party idealists, who 
were also citizens of the United States, did decide for 
themselves what to believe. Their chief problem was that 
they chose to follow the belief system of a foreign state in 
the one nation least likely ever to experience a proletarian 
revolution. Theirs is a recurring theme familiar to many, 
one of the self-righteous sectarian who confuses his faith 
with his church and the church with the priesthood. 
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